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Response
Jesse Bryan Uggla
The world around us is changing more rapidly and profoundly than 
it ever has before and living in this global age demands that we recon-
sider how we think about and act towards the rest of the world. Each 
and every one of us is a trailblazer in a new social, economic, and 
political paradigm, and, not unlike Atlas, we have a heavy burden on 
our shoulders. Indeed, the tone for the next hundred years is being 
set now by the way our global leaders conduct themselves and how 
we as global citizens direct their actions. For all of us, the stakes are 
extremely high.
But how do we exercise these new civic duties brought about by 
globalization? I believe the process begins with dialogue, the sharing 
of ideas, and the struggle not just to acknowledge other people’s per-
spectives, but to thoroughly understand them as well. In the end, we 
may not agree on anything, but if common ground and shared values 
exist, we must seize the opportunity to seek them out and build on 
them. Events like the International Roundtable at Macalester College 
provide this sort of opportunity by bringing together people of diverse 
ideological and philosophical backgrounds, with varying degrees of 
expertise and knowledge, in a single critical engagement. The commis-
sioned essays, in particular, provide a strong base from which intelli-
gent and calculated discussions can be developed.
*****
Dr. Ledeen’s essay provides several important arguments that contrib-
ute significantly to our understanding of this remarkable historical 
moment. To begin, he rightly claims that we must consciously recog-
nize that the United States is an anomalous nation. Though I would be 
hesitant to say that we are “more different” than any other country—
since that type of thinking promotes an “Us versus Them” mentalité 
that can vitiate the exercise of global citizenship—America is unique 
in many regards. Geographically, economically, and politically we are 
a privileged nation; unfortunately, we seldom consider how we’ve 
become so or what that means relative to the rest of the world.
In the same vein, it is true that too many Americans take their 
privileges for granted and fail to realize that the very luxuries they 
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enjoy rest on their ability to protect and maintain them. Engaging in 
domestic issues and acknowledging the link between our international 
demeanor and our domestic security are in every American’s self-inter-
est. Ledeen is therefore right to criticize us for having a myopic under-
standing of politics and international affairs. When we do take an 
interest in the decisions of our leaders, we are shortsighted, we place 
pressure on them to produce quick results, and we prioritize short-
term gains over far more essential long-term objectives. While we can 
place blame on institutions like the media, which Ledeen so accurately 
portrays as misleading, the ultimate responsibility lies with us as pub-
lic actors, voters, and consumers.
In terms of orchestrating foreign policy, we ought to avoid being 
“utopian Washingtonians at peace and crusading Jeffersonians at war.” 
It is imperative that we demarcate a clear set of foreign policy objec-
tives in addition to a pragmatic strategy for realizing them. We need 
to understand that it is not always necessary to achieve total victory 
or humiliating defeat before we disengage in conflict. More impor-
tantly, we should try to avoid viewing our role abroad in terms of “vic-
tory” and “defeat.” While our interests are important, so is justice and 
responsibility. Though it is not a new idea, I will argue later that we 
can do this if we seek to help ourselves by helping others at the same 
time.
Finally, turning to terrorism and the war on Iraq, I must credit 
Ledeen with making two paramount observations. First, we have mis-
managed the struggle against terrorism and need to make some seri-
ous adjustments in order to curtail the phenomenon. Second, there is 
no doubt that a victory in Iraq (whatever that could mean at this junc-
ture) will not quell the discord festering in the Middle East.
Now is a time for rigorous introspection, and Ledeen is right to sug-
gest that we step up our efforts to change direction before we walk too 
far down the wrong path.
*****
Bearing these in mind, I will now discuss a few points where the 
opinions of Dr. Ledeen and I diverge. For one, while it may be true 
that Americans tend to think that peace is the natural state of human 
affairs, rather than war, I do not think we are ill prepared to defend 
ourselves as a nation. Do we really dismantle our military apparatus 
after a particular struggle ends? Are we really always “candidates for a 
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sucker punch”? Since the late 1940s we have either overtly or covertly 
engaged our military in more than twenty-six conflicts throughout the 
world.1 We have military bases on every continent, barring Antarctica, 
and we spend hundreds of billions of dollars each year on improv-
ing our military-industrial complex.2 I think this tendency, in fact, lies 
at the heart of one of our major problems as a nation. We do need a 
superior military to protect our interests in the world, but we fail to 
understand that there are other ways to use our resources to achieve 
that objective. While our Congress has been willing to spend 16% of 
the national budget on defense, the spending on international affairs 
has diminished from 4% in the 1960s to just 1% today.3 Our military 
is definitely important, but as Joseph Nye points out in his book The 
Paradox of American Power, “it is not sixteen times more important than 
diplomacy.”4
In relation to terrorism, Ledeen suggests that preemptive action 
may be our best bet to avoid the potential “first strike” that could bring 
ruin to our nation. I would argue that such a disposition could only 
increase threats against us, as it would surely provoke enormous ani-
mosity in our direction. Furthermore, even if we were somehow capa-
ble of wiping out an entire terrorist group, or a network of groups for 
that matter, we would only be acting in a reactionary manner toward 
the fundamental problem. If we should preempt anything, it should be 
the behavior that causes terrorists to loathe us in the first place, such as 
assuming what other countries need without asking for their input or 
masking the pursuit of our interests in a rhetoric of benevolence. In the 
best-case scenario, preemptive strikes and the unilateralism that often 
characterizes them will provide us with the very temporary solutions 
that Ledeen himself criticizes; in the worst case, we will encourage 
hatred among our foes and tempt our allies to conspire against us.
This relates to another aspect of Ledeen’s argument: that we need 
to focus on the terror masters, that is, the leaders of nations, religious 
groups, and other sects who support and protect the terrorists. While 
this is undeniably part of the equation, the quintessential cause of 
disdain toward us cannot be eliminated by pursuing such an agenda. 
Even if states like Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Saudi Arabia only support anti-
Western terrorism because they believe our democratic example is a 
threat to the legitimacy of their regimes—a notion that I think is some-
what unfounded historically5—deposing their leaders will not address 
the causes of terrorism. Hatred against us does not only derive from 
the fears of tyrannical leaders and those who imprudently accept their 
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declamations as fact. It comes from the way we are viewed abroad—
our perceived intentions in relation to the rest of the world and the 
nature of our domination in the global system. Will eliminating the 
terror masters preclude others from rising through the ranks to replace 
them? Once again, it seems that Ledeen favors short-term solutions to 
problems that require long-term strategies.
To be fair, however, I must acknowledge that Ledeen’s ultimate 
tactic is not to use force to confront terrorism, but to promote “demo-
cratic regime change” abroad. He states: “It doesn’t require armies, it 
requires money and equipment—like satellite phones and radio and 
television stations—and above all consistent and coherent statements 
from all our leaders.” I think we should promote democracy wherever 
possible, but I’m confused as to how we are supposed to do that with 
money, equipment, and the statements of our leaders. If this means 
some form of intervention, would we not be accused of doing what we 
always do—pursuing our interests in the name of our alleged ideals? If 
it means opening channels of global communication so that others can 
see how we live, desire it for themselves, and fight for it, are we really 
so certain that our way of life is attractive to people in other parts of the 
world? Americans are apathetic and indifferent toward political mat-
ters. Our leaders, as Ledeen points out, are inadequate, and our demo-
cratic system is pregnant with contradictions. In an article recently 
published in The Economist, entitled “No Way to Run a Democracy,” 
a number of serious defects in our system are outlined, including an 
electoral college that is unresponsive to the popular vote;6 half of an 
electorate that doesn’t vote at all; campaigns awash with corporate 
money and negativity; the demarcation of congressional districts by 
legislators that assures their reelection;7 overly complicated registra-
tion policies; and unreliable electronic voting equipment that doesn’t 
leave a paper trail.8 These considerations only scratch the surface. Dr. 
Ledeen claims that we brought down the Soviet Union despite the fact 
that only a fraction of its subjects were ready to fight for freedom. Did 
not the Soviet Union, in fact, collapse due to the inherent contradic-
tions in its economic system and the repression by a centralized state? 
Perhaps intervention is not the key. I think that if we want democratic 
regime change overseas we should be open, supportive to those who 
ask for our help, and above all, lead by example by placing our own 
affairs in order so that the logic and stability of our institutions are 
made self-evident.
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*****
Taking a step back from this commentary to add my personal reflec-
tions on the theme of this Roundtable, I would like to make a few 
observations and suggestions for how America, currently the world’s 
only superpower, might envision its role in the global community—
not as an empire, but rather as a just and responsible leader.
As an American, I cannot argue that our country should sacrifice 
its interests or actively relinquish its power. I value the opportunities I 
have and, like most Americans, would like to continue living the way 
that I do, at least for the most part. What must be asked is whether the 
preservation of our interests abroad obviate just global leadership.
Nye says that, “The ability to obtain outcomes one wants is often 
associated with the possession of certain resources, and so we com-
monly use shorthand and define power as possession of relatively large 
amounts of such elements as population, territory, natural resources, 
economic strength, military force, and political stability.”9 According to 
this matrix, America appears to be quite powerful and will likely con-
tinue to be so well into the future. Yet, as he suggests, there are other 
sources of power as well, namely, that which he calls “soft power.” 
Based in part on the ideas of Antonio Gramsci, Nye defines this soft 
power as the capacity to set the political agenda in ways that shape the 
preferences of others. He explains:
Soft power is not merely the same as influence, though it is one source 
of influence. After all, I can also influence you by threats or rewards. 
Soft power is also more than persuasion or the ability to move people by 
argument. It is the ability to entice and attract. And attraction often leads 
to acquiescence or imitation.10
In essence, if a country can get another to want what it wants, it doesn’t 
have to force it to do what it does not want to do.
In Nye’s opinion, the countries that have the greatest chance of exer-
cising soft power in the 21st century are: (1) those whose dominant 
cultures relate closely to global norms; (2) those who have access to the 
infrastructure of communication and thus can influence how important 
issues are framed; and (3) those whose credibility is highly esteemed 
as a result of their domestic and international behavior.11 America is 
in a better position than most countries to exercise this crucial form 
Macalester International  Vol. 16
84
of power, as long as our leaders can be convinced to act quickly and 
sensibly.
In taking such a position, I am not suggesting that military, eco-
nomic, and other forms of “hard” power are irrelevant to our national 
project. I simply believe that we shouldn’t focus too narrowly on them; 
hard and soft power are mutually reinforcing.
The question remains, however: how can soft power preserve our 
status and protect our interests in the world? My response, derived in 
large part from the work of Nye, is that while our survival is priority 
number one, we should try to use our soft power, and the common val-
ues that it relates to, for building alliances, constructing global public 
goods, and directing our behavior in ways that generate acceptance 
and approval from other people in the world.
In relation to alliances and public goods, we can strive to: (1) main-
tain the balance of power in important regions of the world; (2) promote 
an open international community; (3) preserve international commons, 
like the environment; (4) maintain international rules and institutions; 
(5) provide economic assistance to other nations when appropriate; 
and (6) act as convener and mediator in global conflicts.12
In other matters, we can exercise prudence in humanitarian inter-
ventions and strive to embrace multilateral action. For the former, this 
could mean respecting the right to self-determination, encouraging 
other actors to take the lead in intervention, and making sure that suc-
cess is feasible before we commit ourselves to a cause. As to the latter, 
while we cannot subordinate our pivotal interests, we should recog-
nize that we benefit in many ways from multilateralism. It reduces 
the incentive to build alliances against us, it helps share the burden of 
international responsibility, and it enhances our soft power through 
the prerequisite of operating through common values.13
If managed properly, I believe a balance can be struck between our 
interests and survival as Americans, on the one hand, and global inter-
ests coupled with human survival, on the other. The key is recognizing 
when and how to use our various resources and influence.
In sum, we must recognize the gravity of this crucial moment in 
history. We are the pioneers of a new system and all of us need to ask 
ourselves what that means. I suggest that we should frequently remind 
ourselves of our global citizenship, and seek relationships with one 
another that will help us confront the perils and contradictions that are 
inherent in this system. As for leadership, and specifically America’s 
role in this global calculus, now is the time for a push towards greater 
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responsibility and global justice. As I have tried to argue, for Ameri-
cans, this is cogent for at least two reasons. One, it fortifies our position 
through the accumulation of soft power and protects us from harm by 
influencing others to hold our society in high esteem. Two, some of our 
interests, such as stopping global terrorism or nuclear proliferation, 
are simply impossible to achieve without the help of others. In the final 
analysis, if we desire a Pax Americana rather than a “Pox Americana,” 
we need to urge our leaders to change our national strategies to the 
tune of greater cooperation, the pursuit of mutual interests, and above 
all, respect for the responsibilities of global citizenship.
Notes
1. Major U.S. interventions, both overt and covert, include China (1945), Greece (1947–
49), Korea (1950–53), Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954), Indochina (1954–73), Lebanon (1958), 
the Congo (1960–64), Cuba (1961), Indonesia (1965), the Dominican Republic (1965–66), 
Chile (1973), Angola (1976–92), Lebanon (1982–84), Grenada (1983–84), Afghanistan 
(1979–1989), El Salvador (1981–92), Nicaragua (1981–90), Panama (1989–90), Iraq (1991), 
Somalia (1992–94), Haiti (1994, 2004), Bosnia (1995), Yugoslavia (1999), Afghanistan 
(2001–present), and Iraq (2003–present).
2. We currently spend about 400 billion dollars on our military every year. See Sherle R. 
Schwenninger, “A World Neglected: The Foreign Policy Debate We Should Be Having,” 
The Nation 279, no. 12 (18 October 2004): 14.
3. Joseph Nye, The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go it 
Alone (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 143.
4. Ibid.
5. The United States has a history rife with examples of support for tyrannical dictator-
ships and authoritarian governments, both during the Cold War and after. Our security 
and economic interests seem to far outweigh our concern for democracy abroad.
6. “[E]ven if you accept that Mr Bush won the electoral college fairly, which by most 
measures he did, there is the awkward point that Al Gore won more votes.” Quoted in 
“No Way to Run a Democracy,” The Economist 372, no. 8393 (18–24 Sept 2004): 13.
7. “The result is gerrymandering on a grotesque scale, with incumbents stitching up safe 
seats by drawing absurd districts that look like doughnuts, sandwiches and Rorschach 
tests.” Ibid.
8. “In one recent Indiana contest, 5,352 voters somehow produced 144,000 votes.” Ibid.
9. Nye, p. 5.
10. Ibid., p. 9.
11. Ibid., p. 69.
12. Ibid., p. 147.
13. Ibid., p. 167.
